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Abstract 
Financial contracts represent an exchange of financial resources today, such as 
money, for a promise to return more financial resources tomorrow. The aim of the 
paper is to test whether cheating or respecting a promise, in particular a “financial 
one”, is also a matter of community norms in which the individuals are involved. 
According to the social capital literature, where a community is characterised by a 
high level of social capital, then a higher level of civic engagement, trustworthiness 
and self monitoring among its members occur. These elements characterise the so 
called community governance. By using regional data from Italy, the paper will 
analyse the association between the community governance, through different aspects 
of social capital, and credit market variables such as interest rate, credit supply and 
insolvency rate without and with legal institutional enforcements. Empirical evidence 
shows that, in absence of legal enforcement, indicators of structural social capital, 
civic engagement and outcome-based social capital are positively related to better 
credit market performances. When legal enforcement is included in our models still 
social capital, through the civic engagement aspect, negatively affects the insolvency 
rate by confirming our hypothesis of complementarity among community state and 
market.       
 
1 Introduction 
Financial contracts represent an exchange of financial resource today, such as money, 
for a promise to return more financial resource tomorrow. The aim of the paper is to 
test whether cheating or respecting a promise, in particular a “financial one”, is also a 
matter of community norms in which the individuals are involved. 
To this purpose, the paper studies a pooled cross section of the 20 Italian regions in 
the 1998 and 2003. The central question is whether regional differences in Italy 
relative to credit market variables such as interest rate, credit supply and insolvency 
rate are related to social capital with and without legal institutional enforcement. The 
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definition of social capital we consider in this paper is that one advanced by Putnam 
et al (1993) where it refers to connections among individuals that characterise a social 
network where norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness arise from the members.   
Empirical evidence shows that in absence of legal enforcement, the indicators of 
social capital in the forms of structural, cognitive and outcome-based are significantly 
related to the credit market variables. This suggests that the thesis of Putnam et al 
(1993) on social capital and the Italian regions can be extended to the credit market 
too. Moreover, our results suggests that, on line with Beugelsdijk and Schaik (2004), 
it is not the mere existence of network relationships that conditions regional credit 
market “performances” rather the active involvement in these relationships1. 
Alternatively, our paper confirms the important results about the positive effects of 
social capital on regional financial development in Italy advanced by Guiso et al 
(2004). When legal enforcement is included in our model, the social capital indicator 
in the form of civic engagement together to the variable “legal” is still significantly 
related to the insolvency rate. This result confirms the thesis of complementarity 
between community governance, State and market advanced by Bowles and Gintis 
(2002).       
In the social capital literature so far, empirical evidence shows that social capital 
positively affects economic performances and the societies’ well being either at the 
local level or at the state level (Putnam 1993, Knack and Keefer 1997, Knack 1999, 
2002, Guiso et al 2004, Putnam and Helliwell etc…). Grootaert (2001) attributes this 
beneficial effect of social capital to three main elements. Firstly, the sharing of 
information among association members is likely to reduce transaction costs. 
Secondly, shared attitudes and the sense of community belonging may facilitate 
collective decision making. Finally, the solidarity and reciprocity that arise within the 
community may decrease opportunistic behaviours. According to Bowles and Gintis 
(2002) all these characteristics represent the tools of the community governance. The 
main question of the paper is whether these tools affect the credit market 
performances.    
Under credit market imperfections, problems of asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders about the quality and the riskiness of the borrowers’ project are 
likely to occur. This initial condition leads the lenders to face adverse selection 
                                                 
1 In the case of Beugelsdijk and Schaik (2004) the study is extended to 54 European regions and 
analysis is focused on economic growth.  
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problems which, in turn, increase the gap between the cost of external financing in a 
uniformed capital market and the internally generated funds facing by the borrower 
(Hubbard 1998). On the other hand, ascertaining the quality and the riskiness of the 
project implies increasing monitoring costs for the lenders which require a higher 
return to compensate them from the extra costs. This is more likely to occur especially 
in environments, or communities, where the risk of opportunistic behaviour is higher. 
To our knowledge there is a limited number of works in the literature that have 
attempted to provide a direct link between social capital and the credit market. Ferray 
(2002) conducted a qualitative analysis about the financing of “Parisian brasseries” by 
the Parisian banks. By integrating trust and social capital in the lending activity 
analysis, he argued that “asocial” scientific methods of risk evaluation and 
institutional device applied by bankers are insufficient to efficiently reduce the risk 
related to their lending activities. When a financial counsellor belongs to a social 
network, he is able to add extra information about the potential customers. This 
allows the lender to use what Ferray (2002) calls a method of social risk evaluation 
based on the acquisition of the information through the informal relationships the 
counsellor holds with the rest of the community. This method of course does not 
substitute the institutional one but it helps the banker in the lending decision process. 
Guiso et al. (2004), instead, investigates the effect of social capital on financial 
development in Italy. By using outcome-based social capital indices such as electoral 
participation and blood donation they found that in areas with a higher level of social 
capital families are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more in stock, 
and have higher access to credit. Hong et al (2004) have analysed the link between 
social interaction and the stock market participation in the US society. By dividing the 
investors into two types, “non-social” and “social”, they found that households that 
either know their neighbours or attend church have about a 4% higher probability of 
participating in the stock market than “non-social” households. One of the candidate 
reasons was that a social agent finds more attractive to participate in the market when 
more of his peers do. In different words, for a social investor the net cost of 
participating in the market is influenced by the choices of his peers.  
Positively inspired by this short listed literature, this paper will investigate the 
relationship between different types of social capital indicators and credit market 
characteristics such as the level of interest rate, probability of lending to households 
and insolvency rate. The analysis will be developed through two stages. In the first 
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one we will concentrate essentially on the effect of the social capital variables on the 
credit market performance in a scenario without institutional enforcement. In the 
second stage we will focus on the complementarity between community governance 
and State governance by including legal enforcement in our model. The paper 
provides its contribution to the literature under different aspects. Firstly, the paper 
considers financial variables that better capture the lender-borrower relationship under 
asymmetric information such as the interest rate and the probability of lending. 
Secondly, to our knowledge this is the first empirical attempt in the literature in 
directly linking social capital and credit insolvency either under legal enforcement or 
without it. Thirdly, the paper will develop the analysis at the regional level by trying 
to provide a general picture of the country but still by taking into account the different 
regional characteristics that mark the Italian reality.  
While the credit market variables come from the section of “Regional Economies” of 
the Bank of Italy, the social capital indicators are constructed by using secondary data 
from two different survey made by the Italian National Bureau of Statistics in the 
1998 and 2003. According to Giuso et al (2004) social capital measures should be 
chosen with accurate attention since they may be contaminated by other factors. For 
instance in considering the measure of trust derived from the World Value Survey one 
of the problems the analysis might face would be the direction of the effect of the 
trust. Is the level of trust that an individual exhibits the result of good law 
enforcement or the product of a high level of social capital? We will use four different 
indices of social capital. Two of them are structural social capital indices. More 
precisely an indicator of bonding social capital based on parental-relatives network 
and an indicator of bridging social capital based on friends and neighbours. The third 
one indicates the level of civic engagement through the percentage of individuals 
actively involved in associational activities as volunteer. The fourth one is the so 
called outcome-based index referring to the percentage of individuals that have 
received economic help from family members and friends. 
The paper is structured as it follows. 
Section 2 describes the concept of social capital and community governance and the 
relationship between these two elements. Moreover, in this section we describe the 
social capital variable that we adopt in our analysis.  
In Section 3 we analyse the relationship between social capital and credit market in 
Italy. By using regional data from 1998 and 2003 we develop a descriptive analysis 
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by considering differences in geographical partitions and we test empirically whether 
social capital affects credit market performances considering the level of the interest 
rate, the probability of lending and the level of insolvency in the lender-borrower 
relationship. Since we use data of 1998 and 2003 our analysis will be developed 
through pooled cross sections where the observations will be at the regional level.     
In Section 4 we include legal enforcement in the model. We analyse the effect of 
juridical efficacy and community governance on the loan repayment. 
Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Social capital and Community Governance 
This paper is based on the assumption that everything we do in our life, any action, 
choice and outcome is conditioned somehow by the society in which we are involved. 
This is not a new assumption of course rather it is simply the framework where the 
majority of social sciences work. 
Bowles and Gintis (2002) call this society community. A community is “a group of 
people who interact directly, frequently, and in multi-faceted ways” (Bowels and 
Gintis 2002, pg. 420). Colleagues, neighbourhoods, groups of friends, professionals, 
business networks, gangs and sport leagues are just some examples of communities. 
Still according to Bowels and Gintis (2002), the list above suggests that connection, 
not affection is the defining characteristic of a community. The power and, therefore, 
the importance of these connections has been formalised by the sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu who said that “social capital is the sum of resources actual or virtual that 
accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more 
or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119). It is quite obvious that the relationships and the 
connections between members of a community are not homogeneous. A community is 
likely to be made by different social circles: family, friends, colleagues and so on. The 
connections inside a social circle (for instance a family) are characterised according to 
Granovetter (1973) by strong ties. The members belonging to the same circle are 
likely to share similar, if not identical, information2. If an individual wants to have 
access to different information he needs a link with a different social circle too. The 
                                                 
2 The individual embedded in a social circle tends to have characteristics homophilous with the other 
members of the same circle. By homophilous interactions Granovetter means the interactions that 
occur between two actors having similar resources (for instance information). 
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ties between different social circles are called bridges without which the circles will 
be independent. The combination between these two types of connections is an 
advantage in order to have a more spread information flow and characterises what 
Granovetter (1973) defines as the “Strength of weak ties”. Individuals having 
different types of connections can count on a more diversified social endowment. 
According to Putnam (1993), this social endowment is greater in realities 
experiencing higher level of associational life. Individuals involved in civic 
associations hold a more diversified network and develop a spirit of civic engagement 
that increases the respect of the social norms by the members of the network, 
intensifies a system of reciprocity and trust and raises the community’s reputation. 
All these elements combined together characterise what Bowels and Gintis (2002) call 
“Community governance” where the community represents an organism able to 
provide some norms and rules that create the framework where its members live and 
interact together on a daily basis. One of the strengths of the Community governance 
is the access to private information unavailable to governments and markets. 
Moreover, the community has higher possibilities of monitoring the behaviour of its 
members and it has also the instruments to punish individuals who behave against the 
social norms. After iterated free-riding actions, an individual (or a sub-group) might 
be excluded by the social life of the community by losing, in this way, the right to use 
the embedded resources provided by the community to its members. Alternatively 
(with similar consequences), and individual that behaves “anti-socially” might loose 
reputation and be considered not reliable by the other members of the community.  In 
a theoretical work Kandory (1991) shows that in the presence of a mechanism which 
systematically processes some information among community members, social norms 
are respected and community enforcement occurs. Community enforcement is defined 
by Kandory (1991) as a mechanism where agents change their partners over time and 
dishonest behaviour against one partner causes sanctions by other members in the 
society. In other words, this mechanism forces the members of the community to 
respect the social norms3 set in that community. 
Hence, what it matters is the information transmission among the community 
members. In the game advanced by Kandory (1991) each agent carries a label (such 
                                                 
3 Kandory (1991) defines social norm as the specification of desirable behaviour together with sanction 
rules in a community. This social norm may work to support efficient outcomes in frequent 
transactions.   
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as reputation, membership, citizenship, credit cards etc…) which transmits the 
necessary information. In this case, the community somehow “marks” deviators. 
Under the assumption that the social norm requires that an individual should not 
cooperate if the potential partner is labelled as a deviator, nobody has an incentive to 
deviate from the equilibrium path when the punishment is sever enough. This 
mechanism works, of course, reversely as well. In the case an individual is likely to 
deal with many deviators in the future, then, the punishment might be costly to carry 
out and this may destroy the incentive for them to cooperate. In simple words, when 
the information transmission depict a community in which dishonest behaviours are 
likely to occur without community punishment the tendency of respecting social 
norms is low because the community enforcement is weak. Kandory (1991) 
underlines that this information is determined by personal experience such as how 
many deviators each of the individual has seen and in which occasions. This is in line 
with our hypothesis. In regions where the level of civic engagement and social 
reputation is higher, we might expect that the tendency of cheating is lower and that 
the social norm, such as to keep a promise to repay a loan, is more likely to be 
respected. This, in turn, is likely to positively affect the borrower-lender relationship 
under different aspects of the credit contract. In simple words, in environments where 
the level of social capital is higher the community governance is more efficient. It is 
opportune to underline that the community governance does not always have a 
positive connotation. Bowels and Gintis (2002) indicate at least three community 
failures. Firstly, where the bonding ties are dominant or exclusive, the preference of 
an individual for dealing with fellow members constrains the capacity of the 
community to benefit from trade on a wider basis. Secondly, where group 
membership is the result of individual choice rather than group decisions, the risk of 
the community of being culturally and demographically homogeneous is high. This 
implies that the community will suffer of lack of diversity. In Granovetter (1973) 
terms, the homophilous interactions will dominate the system of social connections. 
Thirdly, the benefits of belonging to a community are exclusive to its members but 
exclusive to outsiders. When insider-outsider distinctions are made “on repugnant 
bases such as race, religion, nationality or sex” (Bowels and Gintis 2002 p.428) 
community governance is likely to increase the level of hostility rather than reducing 
markets and states’ failures.       
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Notice that the framework characterised by the community governance is not 
alternative to that one provided by the State and the markets. The Community is just a 
complement organism that might give a contribution to governance where the State 
and the market fail because of lack of information. What the literature on community 
governance and social capital promote is that these three organisms, state, market and 
community, affect each other, their structure and their performances (Diagram 1).  
 
 
(State) 
 
 
             (Community & Family) 
                                   
                                                                        (Market) 
 
 
The direction of the influences is still ambiguous and very complicated to derive. 
Does the Government legal set affects the market and the social behaviour or the other 
way round? Does a more developed market economy reduce criminal intents or is it 
more plausible that a more historical civic engaged society conditions the 
performance of the economic and financial markets? The paper will focus mostly on 
the hypothesis that state and community might influence the some market behaviours 
even though we cannot exclude the opposite.  
 
2.1 Social Capital across the Italian Regions  
The report on “Relatives and safety net” in 1998 published by the ISTAT indicates 
that 42% of 14+ individuals declare to have relatives on which they can count or that 
they are particularly closed in terms of affect: North-West 45.5%, North-East 45.4%, 
Centre 42.5%, South 38.9% and islands 41.4%. Among these relatives they declare to 
count more on consanguinity relations rather than relatives in law. Still the ISTAT 
underlines, five years later, that in the 2003 the percentage of individuals declaring to 
have relatives they can count on rises to 45.9%. If we consider the network based on 
friends, in the 1998 the 60.3% of individual males declare to have friends to count on 
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while for the women this percentage is lower (55.6%). Notice the difference between 
geographic partitions: 62.2% North-East, 61.4% North-West, 58.1% Centre, 56.6% 
islands, 51% South. Higher frequency of meeting occurs at a younger stage of the 
individual life (until 24 years old) and more among males (59.6%) than females 
(47.5%). In the 2003 the percentage of individuals declaring to have friends to count 
on decreases (59.3%). Still, in the North-East there is the highest percentage of 
individuals with friends to count on (64.6%) and in the North-West (63.2%) against 
the South (51.2%).    
As anticipated in the introduction, in our analysis we will use four different indices of 
social capital: Bonding (bond), bridging (bridge), associational activity (vol) and 
informal help (help).   
According to Uphoff (1999) the structural social capital is associated with a variety of 
networks that contribute to cooperation and to mutually beneficially collective 
actions. From the surveys made by ISTAT we construct the average “network 
density” for each region and for each of the two years (1998 and 2003). The diagram 
2 presents the network structure. 
 
Diagram 2 
% 
Individuals 
Siblings 
non 
cohabitant 
Mother 
And 
Father 
Alive   
Sons non 
cohabitant 
Relatives to 
count on 
Friends to 
count on 
(for sure) 
Neighbours to 
count on 
Friends to 
count on 
(maybe) 
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According to this diagram we consider the percentage of individuals for each region 
that belong to this extended network. In simple words, from the ISTAT surveys we 
can measure for instance the percentage of the individuals in the region X that have 
sons non cohabitant, mother and father alive, relative to count on and so on. We 
divide this system of connections into bonding and bridging ties.  
Bond indicates the percentage of individuals holding a parental and relatives network 
composed by siblings non cohabitants, mother and father alive, sons and daughters 
non cohabitants and relatives to count on. The resulting regional scores range from a 
minimum of 48.3 (the region of Liguria in 1998) to a maximum of 54.9 (the region of 
Molise in the 2003).   
Bridge indicates the percentage of individuals holding a network composed by friends 
to count on (surely), friends to count on (maybe), one neighbour to count one, and at 
least two neighbours to count on. The regional scores in this case range from 31.7 (the 
region of Puglia in 2003) to a maximum of 46.1 (the region of Valle d’Aosta in 1998) 
Vol is calculated as the percentage of individuals actively involved in associational 
activities as volunteer. More precisely indicates the percentage of individuals for each 
region that have positively answered to the question whether they have provided help 
as volunteer in the last 12 months. According to the popular analysis developed by 
Putnam et al (1993) about the different level of social capital and economic and 
governance performance in the Italian regions, more horizontal social relationships 
based on trust and shared values are combined with a higher participation rate in 
social organizations. Putnam et al (1993) notice that regions with higher associational 
activity present higher level of social capital. Hence, they infer active members of 
voluntary associations cultivate a habit of cooperation, solidarity and public-
spiritendness. This implies a higher level of civic engagement, reciprocity and 
honesty positively related to general trust. However, still Putnam (2000) underlines 
that the causal arrows among civic engagement and generalised trust are ambiguous in 
directions. Whether civic engagement and sense of honesty affects trust or the other 
way round is still an open question in the literature. To our purpose we consider the 
level of civic engagement as a proxy of generalised trust inside the society whether it 
is a trust-product or a trust-determinant. Following Uphoff (1999) and Beugelsdijk 
and Schaik (2005) this variable represent the so called cognitive side of the social 
capital. Uphoff (1999) argues that the source of manifestations of the cognitive social 
capital are norms, values and beliefs while its dynamic factors are represented by the 
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level of civic culture, trust, solidarity and cooperation. Since active volunteers are 
positive “conductors” of these elements, we will consider the variable vol an indicator 
of cognitive social capital.       
Help indicates the percentage of individuals that have received economic helps from 
family and friends. Recalling the definition of structural social capital advanced by 
Uphoff (1999), whether networks are formal or informal are held together by mutual 
expectations of benefits and sustained by expectations of reciprocity. In other words, 
“interpersonal relationships that aggregate into social networks need to be sustained 
by the contributions that people make to each other’s welfare” (Uphoff 1999 p. 229). 
The informal help represents one of the expressions of this reward (or more 
economically, resource) deriving from the network. This resource is composed from 
one side by a form of investment in structural social capital made by the donor and, 
from the other side, a “payoff” for the recipient. Help can be what in the literature is 
defined as outcome-based social capital index. We consider the safety net as one of 
the outcome of the social capital. Our position about informal lending takes a bit the 
distance from the position assumed by Guiso et al (2004). According to Guiso et al 
(2004 pg 534), “informal lending is a substitute of formal lending when the latter is 
either unavailable or too expensive”. This informal insurance mechanism, according 
to Guiso et al (2004) is more developed in areas with a higher level of family ties and 
a lower level of general social capital. Our different view is based on at least four 
points. Firstly, informal lending might be used not only because of a lack of 
accessibility to formal lending but simply because it reduces agency costs. Secondly, 
receiving informal help might be the outcome of a previous favour that the actual 
recipient did to the actual donor in the past. This reinforces the position taken by 
Uphoff (1999) about the mutual expectations of benefits inside the network. Thirdly, 
the informal lending in many circumstances is a more flexible mechanism where no 
paper contract with strict clauses regulates the exchange. In simple words this 
mechanism implies a promise of return with a more flexible deadline which might 
result more attractive to the members of a community where the level of interpersonal 
trust is higher. Finally, the informal help we use is the expression of the resources 
embedded in the individual social capital structural form. This implies that “help” 
exists thanks to the network extension of an individual. Family and friends represents 
crucial elements of this network. The fact that the family represents a network based 
on strong ties does not necessarily undermine the social capital level of the entire 
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community. The problem with the bonding social capital is not that it exists, rather 
that it might represent a trap when it becomes exclusive or the dominated form. In 
simple words, when this represents the unique social capital resource. 
Table1 (40 observations) 
        help     0.1520  -0.2686   0.4173   1.0000
         vol     0.3082  -0.2614   1.0000
      bridge     0.2148   1.0000
        bond     1.0000
                                                  
                   bond   bridge      vol     help
 
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix between the different measures of social capital 
we adopt. As we can immediately notice, the indicator bond is positively correlated to 
all the other indicators. This result is not surprisingly since the bonding social capital 
represents the “primordial” social resource upon which an individual can start to build 
and enlarge his network and contacts. Unlike bond, the indicator bridge is negatively 
correlated to the measures of associational activities and informal help. What might 
make this indicator a bit puzzling is either its composition or its nature. The indicator 
includes not only friends to count on surely but also individuals that can maybe 
considered friends. If on one hand the combination of these two types of friendships 
identifies the better formula of bridging social capital, on the other hand might affect 
the functioning of the indicator itself. Another aspect that “reduces” the reliability of 
bridge is the different concept of friendship that might occur across different regions 
or different family culture. As Durkin (2000) underlines, due to the subjective nature 
of the question, how people classify those as “close friends” might different 
significantly also across individuals. The variable of associational activity and 
informal help are positively correlated reinforcing our initial assumption that contrary 
to Guiso et al (2004) informal insurance mechanism is not necessarily developed only 
in areas characterised by a lower level of civic engagement. To this purpose table 2 
shows the evolution of the level of associational activity and informal help between 
the 1998 and the 2003 by geographical partitions. Table 2 shows that in the 1998 at 
least 1.43 % of individuals in the North have provided help as volunteer against the 
0.88 % in the South. This proportion has changed along the time and even though the 
percentage of individuals involved in voluntary associations has generally increased 
in the entire country, the distribution across the regions in the 2003 is different (2.08 
% in the North against 2.99 % and 3.16 % respectively in the Centre and in the 
South). The level of civic engagement has increased in the southern regions 
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tremendously, especially in Sicily where 4.75 % of individuals are involved in 
voluntary activities in 2003 against only 0.84 % in the 1998. A reverse trend occurs 
relative to the level of informal help. In the 1998, only 1.46 % of individuals have 
received economic help from parents, relatives and friends in the North against the 
2.49 % and 3.31 % in the Centre and the South respectively. The scenario changes in 
the 2003 where the highest proportion of individuals receiving help is located in the 
North (4.28 %) against the Centre (3.95 %) and the South (4.08 %).   
 
Table 2 
Civic Engagement and Informal Help in Italy (1998 – 2003)  
 Vol 1998 Help 1998 Vol 2003 Help 2003 
North 1.43 1.46 2.08 4.28 
Centre 1.14 2.49 2.99 3.95 
South 0.88 3.31 3.16 4.08 
Source: Values elaborated from ISTAT (1998, 2003) 
 
 
3. Social Capital and Credit Market 
The reports about the economic trend of the Italian regions published by the Bank of 
Italy (1999, 2004) depict a country whose credit market is not homogeneous across 
the regions. Table 3 shows the distributions of banks, in terms of agencies, across the 
country. 
 
Table3 
Distribution of Banks across Italy in 1998 and in 2003 
 North Centre South 
% banks 1998 57.5 % 19.5 % 23 % 
% banks 2003 57.7 % 20.3 % 22 % 
Concentration of banks 
1998 
0.113 0.083 0.047 
Concentration of banks 
2003 
0.131 0.101 0.052 
Source: values elaborated from Bank of Italy (1999, 2004) 
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Between the 1998 and the 2003 the total number of banks in Italy has increased in all 
the three geographical partitions. However, the northern regions host always more 
than 50% of the entire banking industry. Still in the North there is the highest 
concentration of banks (number of banks over hectares) even though the level of 
concentration is raised also in the Centre and in the South. This bank sector 
distribution is due to a higher level of industrialisation facing by the northern regions 
relative to the rest of the country. Also the average interest rates set by the banks for 
credit to what the Bank of Italy calls ordinary clients differ from one region to 
another. To this purpose we consider the average interest rate at regional level 
calculated by “La Centrale dei Rischi”. Graph 1 shows that the interest rate charged in 
the Southern regions (in the histogram from Abruzzo to Sardegna) is generally higher 
with respect to the rest of the country.  
 
Graph 1 
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The setting of the interest rate might depend on the insolvency rate which differs from 
North to the South (Table 4). Even though the ratio between insolvent credit and 
lending decreases between the 1998 and the 2003 in all the country, the level of 
insolvency in the South is in both of the periods more than double than in the North. 
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Table 4 
Insolvency Rate 
 North Centre South 
Insolvency/lending 
1998 
5.4 10.6 18.6 
Insolvency/lending 
2003 
3 4.8 10.8 
Source: values elaborated from bank of Italy (1999, 2004) 
 
The empirical analysis advanced in this section is developed through two stages 
within the borrower-lender relationship. The first one refers to the lending decision 
process which will be represented by the setting of the interest rate and the amount of 
credit provided. The second one, after the funds have been provided, focuses the 
attention on the borrower decision on the repayment. The worse scenario is that the 
lender-borrower relationship ends with the latter to be insolvent. 
  
Diagram 3 
                                                                                                                      Interest rate 
SC           Civic Engagement and Social Trust            Credit Market          Lending 
                                                                                                                      Insolvency  
 
 
The causality diagram above describes the scenario the paper is analysing.  
Recalling Putnam (1993), social capital refers to connections among individuals that 
characterise a social network where norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness arise 
from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called 
“civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” draws attention to the fact that 
civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social 
relations. Putnam underlines that “a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals 
is not necessarily rich in social capital” (Putnam 1993). On the other hand, a society 
rich in social capital presents a high level of civic engagement, social reputation and 
social trust which might affect the well being of its members.  
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Table 5 (38 observations) 
        help    -0.4367   0.3871  -0.0519   0.1608  -0.2538   0.4252   1.0000
         vol    -0.5477   0.2734  -0.2507   0.3107  -0.2851   1.0000
      bridge    -0.1432   0.2633  -0.5241   0.2123   1.0000
        bond    -0.2742   0.2041  -0.0893   1.0000
       insol     0.7010  -0.6697   1.0000
     lending    -0.8342   1.0000
        rate     1.0000
                                                                             
                   rate  lending    insol     bond   bridge      vol     help
 
 
Table 5 indicates that the correlation coefficients between the variables of social 
capital and those of credit. All the social capital variables are negatively correlated to 
the level of the interest rate and the level of insolvency, while they are positively 
correlated to the level of lending. Still the correlation matrix shows that the 
correlation coefficient between the insolvency rate and the informal help is close to 
zero. Different results occur in the correlation between help and the interest rate and 
between help and lending where the coefficients are higher. Among the credit 
variables the correlation coefficients show not surprisingly results. There is a high 
negative correlation between the level of lending and the interest rate and a high 
positive correlation between the interest rate and the level of insolvency. These last 
results are not surprising since high rates are likely to be consequences of high-rates 
of default (Stiglitz 1990). This might induce banks to reduce the level of lending.    
 
 Interest rate and Lending 
The hypothesis we are planning to test is whether social capital might affect the 
supply of credit and the interest rate level. If it is true that regions holding higher level 
of social capital have also higher level of civic engagement, social reputation and 
social trust, this should affect these credit market performances. As Guiso et al (2004) 
underline, financing consists in an exchange of money today for a promise to return 
more money tomorrow. In the decision of lending the money, the financer needs some 
guarantees from the potential financee. If we consider individuals to be our borrowers, 
the main guarantees, or collaterals they may provide are based on the income, job 
stability and the liquidity capacity. Besides this financial collateral, elements like trust 
and reputation are likely to play a complement but still important role. We should 
expect then that higher level of social capital, all else equal, should on one hand, 
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lower interest rate level and, on the other hand, increase the amount of lending by the 
credit institution. 
In the first set of regressions the interest rate is our dependent variable (equation 1). 
As Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) underline, the interest rate is not like a conventional 
price since it represents a promise to pay an amount in the future. Unfortunately, 
“promises are often broken otherwise there would be no issue in determining credit 
worthiness” (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2003 pg. 27). Actually, one of the factors that 
determine high rates is the high costs of screening loan applicants and pursuing 
delinquent borrowers (Stiglitz 1990). Considering that the bank is risk neutral, it will 
set the interest rate on the distribution of clients between risk averse and risk lover. If 
the bank receives signals from the environment or from the community in which it is 
involved and where it operates that there is a higher percentage of risk averse 
individuals, the bank will set a lower interest in order to reduce the probability of 
attracting mainly risk lover borrowers. Notice that we identify the risk averse element 
not only as a pure calculation about the return of the investment project but also as a 
“backwards” decision taken by the potential borrower in order to avoid insolvency 
because of potential social punishment or because of community norms in which the 
borrower believes. In simple words we are testing if cheating or respecting a promise 
is also a matter of community norms in which the individuals are involved.  
In all the models we are going to analyse together with social capital variables we will 
consider also economic and financial collateral such as income (income) and deposit 
(dep). Both the indicators provide information to the lender about the liquidity 
capacity of the potential borrower. We include also the proportion of self-employees 
over total workers (ind). Being a self employee makes the income of the borrower less 
stable over the time and more subjected to the fluctuations of the labour market 
performances. This might create more uncertainty in order to repay the loan and 
increase the level of opacity with respect to the lender.  
 
ititititit
j
itit bankbindbdepbincomebscbbrate ε++++++= 543210 log       (1)
where 
j = Bond, Bridge, Vol, Help 
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Table 6 
                                                                                            
N                      39              39              39              39              39   
r2_a                0.859           0.776           0.843           0.838           0.859   
sigma_u                                                                                     
                                                                                            
                 (12.083)        (14.317)        (12.523)        (10.978)        (10.744)   
_cons              51.462***       60.264***       46.400***       35.828***       43.521***
               (1594.373)      (1954.655)      (1661.794)      (1578.530)      (1500.228)   
bank            -1460.934        -921.382       -2024.080       -2488.543       -1828.041   
                  (5.660)         (6.683)         (5.761)         (5.354)         (5.198)   
ind                10.441*         18.948***       13.701**        11.626**         8.225   
                  (1.063)         (1.219)         (1.089)         (1.087)         (1.041)   
dep                -2.575**        -4.587***       -3.128***       -2.816**        -2.261** 
                  (1.151)         (1.388)         (1.186)         (1.181)         (1.141)   
logincome          -3.877***       -4.224***       -3.323***       -2.934**        -3.633***
                  (0.101)                                                         (0.099)   
help               -0.216**                                                        -0.239** 
                  (0.135)                         (0.140)         (0.120)         (0.118)   
vol                -0.479***                       -0.534***       -0.658***       -0.569***
                  (0.047)         (0.056)         (0.049)                                   
bridge              0.017           0.081           0.027                                   
                  (0.095)         (0.104)         (0.100)                                   
bond               -0.139          -0.358***       -0.170*                                  
                                                                                            
                     b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                       m1              m2              m3              m4              m5   
                                                                                            
 
M1 = complete model 
M2 = structural social capital 
M3 = structural + cognitive social capital 
M4 = cognitive social capital 
M5 = cognitive + outcome based social capital 
 
The complete model shows that cognitive and outcome-based social capital indices 
confirm our initial hypothesis. An increase in social endowment in the community 
reduces the level of interest rate. A community with higher civic engagement can also 
count on higher level of generalised trust and social reputation by reducing the 
probability for the lender of dealing with risk lover borrowers. In models M2 and M3 
the measure of bonding social capital is negatively and significantly correlated to the 
interest rate level. However, when help is included in the regression (M1 and M5), it 
seems to capture the “explanation power” of the bonding indicator. The variable help 
is negatively and significantly related to the level of the interest rate. As previously 
underlined, this variable indicates the embedded resource in the community and the 
ability of its members to support each others. This increases from one side the spirit of 
community and the sense of reciprocity, and raises the level of community-
monitoring. On the other hand, this is likely to reduce the monitoring and the 
screening costs supported by the lender. The regressions show two different effects of 
social capital indicators. Bonding and bridging indicators derive mainly from the 
structural social capital concept. Contrary to vol and help they do not indicate civic 
engagement or community spirit, if not inside that structure. What, instead, they 
represent is the system of connections through which information could flow at a 
reducing transaction cost. However, it seems that the network of friends and 
neighbours are not significant. A candidate reason is that the network is not 
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diversified and large enough to capture the entire bridging component. A broader 
bridging variable should include colleagues, sport mates and business friends. 
Not surprisingly the models above show that the economic and financial collateral 
such as income and deposit are negatively related to the interest rate. Higher net 
wealth in terms of disposable income and deposit might represent and efficient 
collateral able to reduce uncertainty about repayment of loans. They represent two 
factors that decrease the opacity of the borrower and make him more reliable. The 
variable ind indicates whether the borrower is a independent worker. In all the 
regressions the coefficient of ind is negative and in most of them is significant at the 
1% level. It is interesting to notice that this variable is not significant where the 
individual can count on the community resources in the form of informal economic 
help. This might increase the individual’s wealth and makes his condition less 
uncertain. Moreover, unlike dependent workers a self employee has to rely on the 
reputation he has built in his working environment. Whether a self employee built a 
positive or a negative reputation is crucial for his work. Hence, the fact that an 
individual is involved in a larger safety net might be the result of his high and positive 
social reputation. We also consider in the model the variable bank which indicates the 
density of the bank agencies relative to the population. According to Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (1993), in a competitive credit market, the interest rate set by one bank 
may depend on the interest rate charged by the other banks. Increasing the interest 
rate in order to increase the return of the loan might not represent an optimal strategy 
since the only borrower the bank may attract are those rejected by the other lenders 
which on average will be higher risk. Even though the coefficient is not significant, 
the sign confirm the direction of the competitive credit market assumption.  
The second set of regressions presented in the equation (2) investigates the 
relationship between social capital and the probability of lending. Unlike Guiso et al 
(2004) that have used a qualitative indicator, we consider the amount of credit 
supplied by the banking sector at the regional level.  
 
itititit
j
itit indbdepbincomebscbblending ε+++++= 43210 log           (2) 
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Table 7 
                                                                                            
N                      37              37              37              37              37   
r2_a                0.793           0.737           0.729           0.712           0.788   
sigma_u                                                                                     
                                                                                            
               (3903.012)      (4205.407)      (4465.033)      (1777.020)      (1600.427)   
_cons           -7038.715*      -7682.130*      -7476.356         609.974       -1096.377   
               (5098.271)      (5401.492)      (5690.640)      (5171.078)      (4536.261)   
ind            -10020.963*     -13890.272**    -13651.384**    -10411.408*      -7118.756   
                (964.517)       (988.382)      (1064.518)      (1088.454)       (962.950)   
dep               972.496        1850.172*       1794.085        1518.473         697.637   
                  (0.046)         (0.052)         (0.053)         (0.047)         (0.041)   
income              0.340***        0.326***        0.326***        0.323***        0.342***
                 (92.303)                                                        (91.919)   
help              296.376***                                                      324.001***
                (123.177)                       (139.048)       (121.586)       (109.183)   
vol               -43.494                          22.095         156.754          43.788   
                 (40.967)        (43.275)        (46.732)                                   
bridge            -13.913         -27.358         -24.844                                   
                 (85.962)        (83.579)        (96.782)                                   
bond              144.227         201.461**       194.085*                                  
                                                                                            
                     b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                       m1              m2              m3              m4              m5   
                                                                                            
 
M1 = complete model 
M2 = structural social capital 
M3 = structural + cognitive social capital 
M4 = cognitive social capital 
M5 = cognitive + outcome based social capital 
 
Empirical evidence shows that only help and bond, where the former is omitted, are 
significant. Embedded resources might represent an important collateral able to affect 
the credit decision of the lenders. However, when the safety net is included in the 
regression, there are two effects. Firstly, the bonding ties are not significant anymore. 
This might be due to the composition of the variable help which implies conections 
with family, relatives and friends and at the same time represents the dynamic factor 
of these conections. Secondly, being an independent worker becomes less significant 
in order to have access to credit. It seems that being a self-employee becomes less 
important when the individual can have access to social resources. The more the 
economic resources provided by the other members are available to the self employee 
the more his economic collateral and credibility are higher. The disposable income 
seems to be considered the main collateral in the lending decision while the level of 
deposit are positively related to the dependent variable but not significant.  
 
 Insolvency 
Recalling the causality diagram 3, in this sub section we consider only the part related 
to the insolvency. 
 
Diagram 4 
SC           Civic Engagement            Credit Market          Insolvency 
 21
 
In our framework we consider the insolvency rate as a tendency of “cheating”. More 
precisely, it might indicate the proportion of risk lover individuals that have access to 
credit4. As the civic engagement and social reputation of a society increase, the 
tendency of being insolvent should reduce. In a community with higher level of 
cooperation and commitment, individual “insolvent” risks to loose reputation not only 
with respect to the banker but with respect to the rest of the community. In societies 
where the level of “dishonesty” is quite low, maybe because it is considered not 
accepted by the community governance, we might expect to find a lower insolvency 
rate too.  
Bowels and Gintis (2002) in their experimental works advanced the concept of strong 
reciprocity. This indicates a behavioural propensity of an individual to cooperate 
conditionally on other group members’ cooperation and to punish the violations of 
social norms even though this might be so costly for the punisher to end up with an 
economic loss. By using public games Fehr and Gintis (2007) finds evidence of a 
relevant share of individuals exhibiting strong reciprocity (figure below). 
 
Figure 1 Cooperation in the absence and the presence of punishment opportunity (Fehr and Gintis – 
2007) 
 
The figure above shows that individuals involved in the same experiment behave as 
self-regarding and as cooperative according to whether in the experiment punishment 
is excluded or included. According to the experiment outcome, therefore, it seems that 
“strong reciprocity must have internalised cooperative social values because not only 
their self interest shapes their behaviour, but conditional cooperation and punishment 
                                                 
4 Of course this explanation is not accurate since a borrower can become insolvent due to different 
other reasons unrelated to the “cheating” one such as changing in market conditions (economic shocks, 
financial crisis etc…) on in his economic wealth (this might also due to change in the borrower’s health 
condition) 
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motives as well”. However, Fehr and Gintis (2007) underline that even under 
internalised cooperative social values, social order5 can break down. If, for instance, 
the share of people that have internalised social cooperative values is not strong 
enough to punish free riders and if free riders keep on going unpunished, also the 
cooperative individuals tend to stop cooperating. One of the things that we consider 
interesting in these works is that, under certain circumstances, the community 
governance through the cooperative behaviour and punishment reduces free riding 
problems. If we transpose this scenario into the case of borrower-lender relationship 
one of the consequences is the insolvency problem where the contract between the 
two agents ends with no repayment  
The model we estimate in this section is the following 
 
itititit
j
itit indbdepbincomebscbbinsol ε+++++= 43210 log                      (3) 
 
 
Table 8 
                                                                                            
N                      38              38              38              38              38   
r2_a                0.673           0.611           0.682           0.642           0.637   
sigma_u                                                                                     
                                                                                            
                 (42.847)        (44.895)        (42.074)        (33.259)        (34.959)   
_cons             159.941***      193.393***      162.043***      223.553***      216.223***
                 (35.124)        (36.048)        (33.703)        (31.491)        (32.443)   
ind               -10.539           9.869         -14.428         -25.933         -20.927   
                  (6.537)         (6.462)         (6.172)         (6.487)         (6.779)   
dep                -8.951         -13.696**        -8.052          -9.349         -10.676   
                  (4.051)         (4.342)         (3.947)         (3.565)         (3.666)   
logincome         -16.317***      -17.741***      -16.625***      -20.915***      -20.371***
                  (0.634)                                                         (0.655)   
help                0.298                                                           0.480   
                  (0.828)                         (0.809)         (0.728)         (0.763)   
vol                -2.361***                       -2.303***       -1.373*         -1.527*  
                  (0.283)         (0.290)         (0.279)                                   
bridge             -0.630**        -0.367          -0.639**                                 
                  (0.590)         (0.557)         (0.572)                                   
bond                0.767           0.053           0.821                                   
                                                                                            
                     b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                       m1              m2              m3              m4              m5   
                                                                                            
 
M1 = complete model 
M2 = structural social capital 
M3 = structural + cognitive social capital 
M4 = cognitive social capital 
M5 = cognitive + outcome based social capital 
 
The table 8 shows that structural social capital as well as help is not significant. The 
level of civic engagement is negatively and significantly associated with the level of 
insolvency confirming the hypothesis that more efficient community governance 
                                                 
5 In Political Philosophy and Sociology several definitions of social order have been advanced. For 
Thomas Hobbess social order can be identified with the changing from the state of nature to the social 
contract. Durkheim defines social order as a set of shared social norms. While Parsons indicates that 
social order is a system of social institutions determining moral behaviour, Habermas adds also 
communicative actions in the definition.    
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reduces the tendency of cheating. The variable vol is negatively and significantly 
related to the insolvency rate. One of the possible candidate explanations is that since 
the level of civic engagement increases the level of social reputation and social 
commitments (Putnam 1993), this might reduce the tendency of cheating. Similar to 
Fehr and Gintis (2007), in a society with higher civic engagement the values of social 
reputation and social commitments might be internalised. The community governance 
in this case might represent an obstacle for potential free riders or risk lovers. 
 The variable bridge is negatively and significantly related to the insolvency rate only 
when civic engagement is included in the regression. A candidate reason might be that 
friendship and weaker conections become valuable only in environment where the 
level of civic engagement is high. This can make friendships more reliable. Still 
disposable income reduces the level of insolvency. Individuals that are better off are 
more likely to repay their debts that have contracted with their creditors.  
 
4. Social capital, Legal Enforcement and Credit Market  
Recalling the diagram 1 we are going to analyse the relationship between the credit 
market and social capital variables by including legal enforcement. The diagram1 then 
can be modified into the following diagram 5  
 
(Legal Enforcement) 
 
 
                            (Social Capital)    
 
                                                                        (Credit Market)  
As Guiso et al (2004) underline social capital might capture the efficiency of the legal 
system. The idea is that weak legal enforcement system might affect the behaviour of 
the individuals and reduce the institutional trust of the region. The goal of this section 
goes even further. We want to investigate the relationship between the institutional 
governance and the community governance with the credit market. In simple words 
we are planning to complete the puzzle. In the last 20 years social and political 
scientists (Inglehart 1999, Kanck and Keefer 1997, Kanck 2002, Paxton, 1999, 
Putnam 1993, 2000, Woolcock 1998, 2000 etc…) have been stressing on the 
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relationship between generalised trust and government performances. In particular all 
of them reach the conclusion that between these two elements there exists a positive 
and significant relation. However, the causality direction is still under debate. This 
paper does not have the ambition to fill this gap, but analyse whether the 
complementarity between government and community governance might exist and 
whether it has an effect on the credit market.   
In the analysis of long term maturity debt and the supply of credit for the Italian firms, 
Magri (2006) argues that the quality of the legal system may affect the financial 
decision of the lender in supplying funds. Where the lender feels more protected by 
the juridical institutions the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard are 
reduced especially in the final stage of non-repayment of the borrower.   
To this purpose Italy represents an interesting case-study. The different regions are 
subject to the same legal system and, specifically relative to the credit market, to the 
same bankruptcy code. However, Graph 2 shows different variability in the degree of 
legal enforcement. The variable of legal enforcement we are going to adopt is similar 
to Guiso et al. (2004). The variable legal indicates the regional average length of time 
(in terms of days) to complete a first degree trial by the courts. Graph 2 shows that the 
length of time to complete a first degree trial by the courts differs quite significantly 
across the regions. In the 1998 in the North in order to complete the first degree trial it 
takes more than two years while in South it takes about four years. Between the 1998 
and 2003 the period for a first degree trial decreased in the entire country but with still 
a relevant difference between North and South (a bit more than two years in the North 
against three and half years in the South). Following the literature (Guiso et al 2004, 
Magri 2006, Omiccioli 2005) we consider a legal system to be less efficient when the 
average period is longer. In other words, in regions where the length of time to 
complete the first degree trial is around four years present a lower juridical efficacy 
than regions where this period is reduced to two years. According to the diagram 4 we 
consider legal enforcement the representative ability of State governance. Given this 
assumption, we might say that in Basilicata, where in the 2003 it takes more than four 
and half years to complete a first degree trial, the state governance is less efficient 
than in Piemonte where the average period to complete a first degree trial is less than 
two years. 
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The correlation table below links the variables of social capital with the legal 
enforcement 
Table 9 
        help     0.0585   0.1882  -0.2738   0.4076   1.0000
         vol    -0.2106   0.3428  -0.2506   1.0000
      bridge    -0.4996   0.2038   1.0000
        bond    -0.1018   1.0000
       legal     1.0000
                                                           
                  legal     bond   bridge      vol     help
 
According to the correlation matrix, except for help which is close to zero, all the 
social capital variables are negatively correlated with the time of legal enforcement 
which means that they are positively correlated with juridical efficacy.  
The model we want to estimate consider whether social capital together with legal 
enforcement affect the level of insolvency (equation 4). In the previous section civic 
engagement was negatively related to the lack of repayment. In a complete scenario, 
the decision of repayment should be conditioned also by the quality of the legal 
system. A legal system that works more efficiently should reduce the insolvency rate.  
 
ititititit
j
itit legalbindbdepbincomebscbbinsol ε++++++= 543210 log            (4) 
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Table 10 
                                                                                            
N                      36              36              36              36              36   
r2_a                0.755           0.704           0.762           0.739           0.730   
sigma_u                                                                                     
                                                                                            
                 (54.790)        (59.873)        (53.755)        (52.568)        (53.466)   
_cons              44.712          52.876          46.798          74.078          74.092   
                 (34.590)        (34.622)        (32.024)        (28.932)        (30.585)   
ind               -56.241         -29.162         -51.277         -49.455*        -49.840   
                  (6.003)         (5.985)         (5.558)         (5.775)         (6.172)   
dep                -3.550          -8.484          -4.410          -4.983          -4.895   
                  (5.098)         (5.576)         (5.022)         (5.229)         (5.322)   
logincome          -6.144          -4.931          -6.186          -6.311          -6.302   
                  (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)   
legal               0.012***        0.014***        0.012***        0.014***        0.014***
                  (0.589)                                                         (0.597)   
help               -0.247                                                          -0.028   
                  (0.762)                         (0.744)         (0.639)         (0.679)   
vol                -2.065**                        -2.109***       -1.185*         -1.176*  
                  (0.280)         (0.285)         (0.276)                                   
bridge             -0.475          -0.184          -0.475*                                  
                  (0.558)         (0.510)         (0.532)                                   
bond                0.992*          0.164           0.933*                                  
                                                                                            
                     b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                       m1              m2              m3              m4              m5   
                                                                                            
 
M1 = complete model 
M2 = structural social capital 
M3 = structural + cognitive social capital 
M4 = cognitive social capital 
M5 = cognitive + outcome based social capital 
  
When legal is included in the analysis three interested results come out. Firstly, 
juridical inefficacy is positively and significantly related to the insolvency rate. Where 
the length of time increases the insolvency level is higher. Secondly, the income is not 
significant any more. It seems that without “institutional justice” the private resource 
plays a crucial rule in the repayment process. When “institutional justice” intervenes 
the net wealth of the individuals is still negatively related but not significant. Thirdly, 
the variable of civic engagement is still negatively and significantly related to the lack 
of repayment. This result might be interpreted as a complementarity effect between 
the community and state governance. By including juridical efficacy the adjusted R 
squared is higher which indicates that the equation (4) is an expression of a more 
accurate a more accurate model described by the equation (3). The fact that the wealth 
and financial variables are not significant any longer after we include legal 
enforcement and that only vol remains significant and negative might indicate that the 
repayment process is strongly affected by social and institutional behaviours. As 
Stiglitz (1990) underlines, in developing countries (we would add “not only in 
developing countries”) one of the main obstacle to the development of peer 
monitoring and other institutions comes from inadequate legal systems to enforce 
contracts. A system is inadequate either because based on slow judicial system or 
because ineffective (Stiglitz 1990). The integration between institutional efficacy, 
through a more effective legal enforcement, and the community governance, through 
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a higher level of civic engagement, might be extremely beneficial because the 
contracts in the credit markets (as well as in other markets such the labour market) are 
more respected.      
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The hobbesian solution to collective action problems is based on government coercion 
so that every individual is legally constrained to contribute to the public good. 
However, “the need to monitor government is the second-order collective action 
problems to which government coercion cannot be the solution” (Knack 2002, p.773). 
In simple words, the missing link in the Hobbes’ analysis is the positive role of the 
community. Due to lack of vertical and horizontal information government and 
markets fail in their targets. In this paper, empirical evidences show that the 
community governance, through different social capital indicators, can provide a 
positive contribution towards credit market improvements. Together with wealth and 
financial variables, social capital variables are likely to affect the level of the interest 
rate, the probability of lending and the insolvency rate. By including the legal 
enforcement ability, still the community governance together with institutional legacy 
provides its contribution against dishonest behaviours such as lack of loan repayment. 
This might drive to several important policy implications. Firstly, community 
governance should be taken into account when governments set economic and 
financial plans. Social capital in economics is a way to give voice to the community 
characteristics and to the society. Parallel policies that facilitate the growth of social 
resources can be beneficial to the financial market too. Secondly, following Stiglitz 
(1990), legal reforms should provide the lenders more security for the recovery of 
their loans. A better legal system might represent a positive signal to the individuals 
and increase the institutional trust inside the community. As Woolcock (1998, 2000) 
shows, the integration between generalised trust among individuals and institutional 
trust between state and society might represent a key ingredient for market improving. 
Finally, with the related limits, investing in community by markets and state might 
have is beneficial return either in terms of market efficiency or in terms of better 
governance. 
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Appendix Variables 
Table A1 (Variables) 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
Rate Average regional interest rate 
applied for lending to residents 
Bank of Italy 
Lending lending to consumers / population Bank of Italy 
Insol insolvency / lending Bank of Italy 
Independent Variables Description Source 
Bond Percentage of individuals holding 
a complete parental network 
composed by siblings non 
cohabitants, mother and father 
alive, sons and daughters non 
cohabitants and relative to count 
on 
ISTAT 
Bridge Percentage of individuals holding 
a network composed by friends to 
count on (surely), friends to count 
on (maybe), one neighbour to 
count one, and at least two 
neighbours to count on 
ISTAT 
Vol Percentage of individuals involved 
in associational activities as 
volunteer. Did you provide help as 
a volunteer? 
ISTAT 
Help Percentage of individuals that have 
receiving economic helps from 
family and friends during periods 
of economic difficulties 
ISTAT 
Dep Deposit / Value Added ISTAT 
Income income per capita Eurostat 
Ind independent workers / total 
workers 
ISTAT 
Bank Number of agencies / population Bank of Italy 
Legal Regional average length of time 
(in terms of days) to complete a 
first degree trial by the courts. 
ISTAT 
 
